

APPENDIX 1: Treasury Management Strategy Statement Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement 2018/19

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans, which provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council. Although the Council does not borrow to finance its capital spending plans, officers still plan and forecast the longer term cash flow position in order to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations and that it maintains balances (working capital) at a prudent and sustainable level.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

1.2. Statutory and reporting requirements

The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Council to 'have regard to' the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Council's capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals. These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by Members before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Executive & Resources Policy Development & Scrutiny Committee.

Prudential and Treasury Indicators and Treasury Strategy (this report) - This covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a Minimum Revenue Provision Policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the Treasury Management Strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

A Part-Year Treasury Management Report (approved by Council in December 2017) – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether the treasury strategy is meeting the strategy or whether any policies require revision.

An Annual Treasury Report – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

Capital Strategy

In December 2017, CIPFA issued revised Prudential and Treasury Management Codes. As from 2019-20, all local authorities will be required to prepare an additional report, a Capital Strategy report, which is intended to provide the following: -

- a high-level overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this report is to ensure that all elected members on the full council fully understand the overall strategy, governance procedures and risk appetite entailed by this Strategy.

The Capital Strategy will include capital expenditure, investments and liabilities and treasury management in sufficient detail to allow all members to understand how stewardship, value for money, prudence, sustainability and affordability will be secured.

1.3. Treasury Management Strategy for 2018/19

The proposed strategy for 2018/19 covers two main areas:

Capital Issues

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the MRP strategy.

Treasury management Issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators that limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

1.4. Treasury management consultants

The Council uses Link Asset Services, Treasury Solutions (previously Capita) as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

1.5. Elective professional client status

From 3rd January 2018 the Financial Conduct Authority is obligated to treat all Local Authorities as “retail clients” under European Union legislation, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II). The client status of the Local Authority relates to its knowledge and experience with regards to the use of regulated investment products and the decision-making processes it has in place for making such investments. The directive is focused on products such as Certificates of Deposit, Gilts, Corporate Bonds and investment funds, including Money Market Funds.

The Council will opt up to “elective professional” status in order to continue to have access to these funds as an investment option as they are not available to retail clients. The Council had opted up to elective professional status with all relevant counterparties, including its advisers and brokers, prior to the deadline. This will be kept under regular review and counterparties will be added or removed as necessary for the Council’s investment needs.

2. The Capital Prudential Indicators 2017/18 to 2020/21

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The outputs of the capital expenditure plans are reflected in prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members to overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

2.1. Capital Expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts (as per the capital monitoring and review report to Executive on 7th February 2018):

Capital Expenditure	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
Education	12.6	19.6	25.3	1.0	0.9
Care Services	2.7	4.9	8.6	0.0	0.0
Environment	8.2	14.7	10.9	2.2	2.2
Renewal & Recreation	2.1	3.8	11.4	6.5	14.1
Resources	27.3	8.6	20.4	9.2	1.0
Public Protection & Safety	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-Total	53.0	51.6	76.6	18.9	18.2
Add: Future new schemes	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	3.5
Less: Estimated slippage	0.0	-3.5	-15.0	10.0	5.0
Grand Total	53.0	48.1	61.6	37.9	26.7

NB. The above financing need excludes other long term liabilities (finance lease arrangements), which already include borrowing instruments.

The table below shows how the above capital expenditure plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding need (borrowing).

Capital Expenditure	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
Total Expenditure	53.0	48.1	61.6	37.9	26.7
Financed by:					
Capital receipts	9.9	15.7	18.2	23.5	23.4
Capital grants/contributions	16.5	29.4	39.0	3.7	3.2
General Fund	-	-	-	9.3	-
Revenue contributions *	26.6	3.0	4.4	1.4	0.1
Net financing need	53.0	48.1	61.6	37.9	26.7

* These are approved contributions from the revenue budget, earmarked to fund specific schemes.

2.2. The Council's Borrowing Need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need.

If the CFR is positive, the Council may borrow from the Public Works Loans Board (PWLB) or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances on a temporary basis (internal borrowing). The Council's CFR represents liabilities arising from finance leases entered into in recent years in respect of various items of plant and equipment (primarily equipment in schools and vehicles and plant built into highways

and waste contracts). The Council currently has no external borrowing as such. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

CFR	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
Total CFR	3.1	2.3	1.6	1.1	0.6
Movement in CFR	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5	-0.5

Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5	-0.5
Movement in CFR	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5	-0.5

2.3. MRP Policy Statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to make additional voluntary payments (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG Regulations require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision.

The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

MRP will be based on the estimated lives of the assets, in accordance with the regulations, and will follow standard depreciation accounting procedures. Estimated life periods will be determined under delegated powers. To the extent that expenditure is not on the creation of an asset and is of a type that is subject to estimated life periods that are referred to in the guidance, these periods will generally be adopted by the Council. However, the Council reserves the right to determine useful life periods and prudent MRP in exceptional circumstances where the recommendations of the guidance would not be appropriate.

In practice, the Council's capital financing MRP is assessed as 4% of the outstanding balance on the finance leases the Council has entered into. A Voluntary Revenue Provision (VRP) may also be made in respect of additional repayments.

2.4. Core funds and expected investment balances

The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves, etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales, etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year end balances for each resource and anticipated day to day cash flow balances.

Year End Resources	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
General Fund balance	20.0	19.7	19.7	10.4	10.4
Capital receipts	24.1	17.1	15.2	0.0	3.7
Capital grants	36.9	26.6	2.8	2.2	2.1
Provisions	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7
Other (earmarked reserves)	102.5	102.2	89.4	86.4	83.4
Total core funds	196.2	178.3	139.8	111.7	112.3
Working capital*	73.7	80.0	80.0	80.0	80.0
Under/over borrowing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Investments	269.9	258.3	219.8	191.7	192.3

*Working capital balances shown are estimated year end; these may be higher mid-year.

2.5. Affordability Prudential Indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. In practice, these indicators are virtually irrelevant for Bromley, as it has no external borrowing other than residual finance leases. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

2.5.1. Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
	%	%	%	%	%
Non-HRA	-	-	-	-	-

3. Treasury Management Strategy

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1. Current Portfolio Position

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2017 is summarised below, together with forward projections. The table shows the actual external borrowing (the treasury management operations), against the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

	2016/17 Actual	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m	£m
External borrowing					
Borrowing at 1 April	-	-	-	-	-
Expected change in borrowing	-	-	-	-	-
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	3.1	2.3	1.6	1.1	0.6
Expected change in OLTL	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5	-0.5
Actual borrowing at 31 March	-	-	-	-	-
CFR – the borrowing need	3.1	2.3	1.6	1.1	0.6
Under / (over) borrowing	3.1	2.3	1.6	1.1	0.6
Investments	269.9	258.3	219.8	191.7	192.3
Net investments	266.8	256.0	218.2	190.6	191.7
Change in Net investments	+9.5	-10.8	-37.8	-27.6	+1.1

Within the prudential indicators, there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2018/19 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

The Director of Finance reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage non-compliance in the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this year's budget report.

3.2. Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity

3.2.1. The Operational Boundary

This is the total figure that external borrowing is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual borrowing.

Operational boundary £m	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Borrowing	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Other long term liabilities	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
Total Operational Boundary	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0

3.2.2. The Authorised Limit for external borrowing

A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external borrowing is prohibited and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following Authorised Limit:

Authorised limit £m	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Borrowing	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Other long term liabilities	30.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Total Authorised Limit	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0

3.3. Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council has appointed Link Asset Services (formerly Capita) as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives the Link view on short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates.

	Bank Rate	PWL B Borrowing Rates		
		5 year	25 year	50 year
Mar 2018	0.50	1.60	2.20	2.90
Jun 2018	0.50	1.60	2.30	3.00
Sep 2018	0.50	1.70	2.40	3.00
Dec 2018	0.75	1.80	2.40	3.10
Mar 2019	0.75	1.80	2.50	3.10
Jun 2019	0.75	1.90	2.60	3.20
Sep 2019	0.75	1.90	2.60	3.20
Dec 2019	1.00	2.00	2.70	3.30
Mar 2020	1.00	2.10	2.70	3.40
Jun 2020	1.00	2.10	2.80	3.50
Sep 2020	1.25	2.20	2.90	3.50
Dec 2020	1.25	2.30	2.90	3.60
Mar 2021	1.25	2.30	3.00	3.60

As expected, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate at its meeting on 2 November. This removed the emergency cut in August 2016 after the EU referendum. The MPC also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank rate only twice more by 0.25% by 2020 to end at 1.00%. The Link Asset Services forecast as above includes increases in Bank Rate of 0.25% in November 2018, November 2019 and August 2020.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected, that at some point, there would be a more protracted move from bonds to equities after a historic long-term trend, over about the last 25 years, of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial Quantitative Easing, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising bond prices. Quantitative Easing has also directly led to a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election in November 2016 has called into question whether the previous trend may go into reverse, especially now the Fed. has taken the lead in reversing monetary policy by starting, in October 2017, a policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds when they mature.

Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as stronger economic growth becomes more firmly established. The Fed. has started raising interest rates and this trend is expected to continue during 2018 and 2019. These increases will make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US are likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in the UK and other developed economies. However, the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong or weak the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress towards the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

From time to time, gilt yields – and therefore PWLB rates - can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Economic and interest rate forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. The above forecasts (and MPC decisions) will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Geopolitical developments, especially in the EU, could also have a major impact. Forecasts for average investment earnings beyond the three-year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is probably to the downside, particularly with the current level of uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- The Bank of England takes action too quickly over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Geopolitical risks, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, possibly Italy, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- Germany is still without an effective government after the inconclusive result of the general election in October. In addition, Italy is to hold a general election on 4 March and the anti EU populist Five Star party is currently in the lead in the polls, although it is unlikely to get a working majority on its own. Both situations could pose major challenges to the overall leadership and direction of the EU as a whole and of the individual respective countries. Hungary will hold a general election in April 2018.
- The result of the October 2017 Austrian general election is likely to result in a strongly anti-immigrant coalition government. In addition, the new Czech prime minister is expected to be Andrej Babis who is strongly against EU migrant quotas and refugee policies. Both developments could provide major impetus to other, particularly former Communist bloc countries, to coalesce to create a major block to progress on EU integration and centralisation of EU policy. This, in turn, could spill over into impacting the Euro, EU financial policy and financial markets.
- Rising protectionism under President Trump
- A sharp Chinese downturn and its impact on emerging market countries

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- UK inflation returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

- The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of Quantitative Easing, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.

Investment and borrowing rates:

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2018/19 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.
- Borrowing interest rates increased sharply after the result of the general election in June and then also after the September MPC meeting when financial markets reacted by accelerating their expectations for the timing of Bank Rate increases. Apart from that, there has been little general trend in rates during the current financial year. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when authorities may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

3.4. Borrowing Strategy

The Council currently does not borrow to finance capital expenditure and finances all expenditure from external grants and contributions, capital receipts or internal balances. The Council does, however, have a Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) of £3.1m (as at 31st March 2017), which is the outstanding liability on finance leases taken out in respect of plant, equipment and vehicles.

The uncertainty over future interest rates increases the risks associated with treasury activity. As a result the Council will take a cautious approach to its treasury strategy and will monitor interest rates in financial markets.

3.4.1. Treasury indicators for debt

There are three debt-related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these is to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive, they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments;
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

£m	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
Interest rate Exposures			
	Upper	Upper	Upper
Limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt	100%	100%	100%
Limits on variable interest rates based on net debt	20%	20%	20%

Maturity Structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2017/18		
	Lower	Upper
Under 12 months (temporary borrowing only)	100%	100%
12 months to 2 years	N/A	N/A
2 years to 5 years	N/A	N/A
5 years to 10 years	N/A	N/A
10 years and above	N/A	N/A

3.5. Policy on Borrowing in Advance of Need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs, purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds. Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

4. Annual Investment Strategy

4.1. Investment Policy

The Council's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second, then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in appendix 5.3 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices – schedules.

The intention of the strategy is to provide security of investment and minimisation of risk.

4.2. Creditworthiness policy

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Annex 2 under the 'Specified' and 'Non-Specified' Investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's Treasury Management Practices – Schedules.

Investment Counterparty Selection Criteria - The primary principles governing the Council's investment criteria are the security and liquidity of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After these main principles, the Council will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the Specified and Non-Specified investment sections below; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Director of Finance will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to those that determine which types of investment instrument are either Specified or Non-Specified as they provide an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

The rating criteria require at least one of the ratings provided by the three ratings agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors) to meet the Council's minimum credit ratings criteria. This approach is supported by Link and is in compliance with a CIPFA Treasury Management Panel recommendation in March 2009 and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice.

Credit rating information is supplied by Link, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating watches (notification of a likely change), rating outlooks (notification of a possible longer term change) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating watch applying to counterparty at the minimum Council criteria may be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

In addition, the Council receives weekly credit lists as part of the creditworthiness service provided by Link. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moodys and Standard and Poors. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS (Credit Default Swap) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings (these provide an indication of the likelihood of bank default);
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties and a recommendation on the maximum duration for investments. The Council would not be able to replicate this level of detail using in-house resources, but uses this information, together with its own view on the acceptable level of counterparty risk, to inform its creditworthiness policy. The Council will also apply a minimum sovereign rating of A- to investment counterparties.

The criteria for providing a pool of high quality investment counterparties (both Specified and Non-specified investments) are:

- **Banks 1** - good credit quality – the Council will only use banks which:
 - a) are UK banks;
 - b) are non-UK and domiciled in a country with a minimum long-term sovereign rating of A- or equivalent;
 - c) have, as a minimum, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors credit ratings (where rated):
 - Short term – Fitch F3; Moody's P-3; S&P A-3
 - Long term – Fitch BBB+; Moody's Baa3; S&P BBB+
- **Banks 2** – Part nationalised UK bank – Royal Bank of Scotland. This bank can be included provided it continues to be part nationalised (Lloyds is also temporarily included until existing investments mature in 2018/19).
- **Bank subsidiary and treasury operation** - The Council will use these where the parent bank has provided an appropriate guarantee or has the necessary ratings in Banks 1 above.
- **Building societies** - The Council will use all societies that meet the ratings in Banks 1 above.
- **Money Market Funds** – The Council will use AAA-rated Money Market Funds, including VNAV funds.
- **UK Government** (including gilts and the DMADF)
- **Other Local Authorities, Parish Councils, etc.**
- **Housing Associations**

- **Collective (pooled) investment schemes**
- **Supranational institutions**
- **Corporate Bonds**
- **Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper and Floating Rate Notes**

The Council's detailed eligibility criteria for investments with counterparties are included in Annex 2. All credit ratings will be continuously monitored. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use for new investments will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of Credit Ratings, the Council will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the external advisers. In addition, this Council will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that government support. The Council forms a view and determines its investment policy and actions after taking all these factors into account.

4.3. Country limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide). The list of countries that qualify using these credit criteria as at the date of this report is shown in Annex 2. This list will be amended by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

4.4. Investment Strategy

In-house funds: The Council's core portfolio is around £290m although cashflow variations during the course of the year have the effect from time to time of increasing the total investment portfolio to a maximum of around £330m. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Interest returns outlook: Bank Rate is forecast to stay flat at 0.50% until quarter 4 2018 and not to rise above 1.25% by quarter 1 2021. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2017/18 0.50%
- 2018/19 0.75%
- 2019/20 1.00%
- 2020/21 1.25%

Capita's suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 3 months during each financial year for the next eight years are as follows:

- 2017/18 0.40%
- 2018/19 0.60%
- 2019/20 0.90%
- 2020/21 1.25%
- 2021/22 1.50%
- 2022/23 1.75%
- 2023/24 2.00%
- Later years 2.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently skewed to the upside and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

Investment treasury indicator and limit - total principal funds invested for greater than 365 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit: -

As at year end	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Principal sums invested > 365 days	170.0	170.0	170.0	170.0

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its short notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to three months) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

4.5. End of year investment report

After the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

4.6. Scheme of delegation

(i) Full board/council

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities
- approval of annual strategy.

(ii) Boards/committees/council/responsible body

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices
- budget consideration and approval
- approval of the division of responsibilities
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

(iii) Body/person(s) with responsibility for scrutiny

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

4.7. Role of the section 151 officer

The S151 (responsible) officer is responsible for:

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports
- submitting budgets and budget variations
- receiving and reviewing management information reports
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.

5. ANNEXES

1. Economic background
2. Specified and non specified investments – Eligibility Criteria
3. Prudential Indicators – summary for approval by Council

ANNEX 1. Economic Background (Provided by Link Asset Services)

GLOBAL OUTLOOK. World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution**.

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently, in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income**, which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift UP in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UK. After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.2% (+2.0% y/y), quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.7% y/y) and quarter 3 was +0.4% (+1.6% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting MPC. (Inflation actually came in at 3.0% in September and is expected to rise slightly in the coming months.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing** towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 -34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **some consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate in the coming years. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

EU. Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.5% in quarter 1 (2.0% y/y), 0.6% in quarter 2 (2.3% y/y) and +0.6% in quarter 3 (2.5% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in October inflation was 1.4%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has, however, announced that it will slow down its monthly QE purchases of debt from €60bn to €30bn from January 2018 and continue to at least September 2018.

USA. Growth in the American economy was notably erratic and volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1% and quarter 3 coming in at 3.0%. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.2%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has started on a gradual upswing in rates with four increases in all and three increases since December 2016; and there could be one more rate rise in 2017, which would then lift the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four increases in 2018. At its September meeting, the Fed said it would start in October to gradually unwind its \$4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN. GDP growth has been gradually improving during 2017 to reach an annual figure of 2.1% in quarter 3. However, it is still struggling to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: initial two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. In her Florence speech in September 2017, the Prime Minister proposed a two year transitional period after March 2019.
- UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy will leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the two year transitional period.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.

ANNEX 2. Specified and Non-Specified Investments

Eligibility Criteria for investment counterparties

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to a maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' quality criteria where applicable.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: These are any investments which do not meet the Specified Investment criteria (i.e. non-sterling and placed for periods greater than 1 year).

A variety of investment instruments will be used. Subject to the credit quality of the institution and depending on the type of investment made, investments will fall into one of the above categories.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity or those which could be for a longer period but where the Council has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes. These are relatively low risk investments where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. These would include investments with:

1. The UK Government (such as the Debt Management Account deposit facility, a UK Treasury Bill or a Gilt with a maximum of 1 year to maturity).
2. A local authority, parish council or community council (maximum duration of 1 year).
3. Corporate or supranational bonds of no more than 1 year's duration.
4. Pooled investment vehicles (such as money market funds) that have been awarded a high credit rating by a credit rating agency.
5. A bank or building society that has been awarded a high credit rating by a credit rating agency (only investments placed for a maximum of 1 year).
6. Certificates of deposit, commercial paper or floating rate notes (maximum duration of 1 year).

Minimum credit ratings (as rated by Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors) and monetary and time period limits for all of the above categories are set out below. The rating criteria require at least one of the ratings provided by the three ratings agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors) to meet the Council's minimum credit ratings criteria. The Council will take into account other factors in determining whether an investment should be placed with a particular counterparty, but all investment decisions will be based initially on these credit ratings criteria. The Council will also apply a minimum sovereign rating of A- (or equivalent) to investment counterparties.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

Non-specified investments are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined as Specified above) and can be for any period over 1 year. The identification and rationale supporting the selection of these other investments and the maximum limits to be applied are set out below.

Non Specified Investment Category	Limit (£ or %)
Bank Deposits with a maturity of more than one year and up to a maximum of 3 years. These can be placed in accordance with the limits of the Council's counterparty list criteria (i.e. subject to satisfaction of Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors credit ratings criteria shown below).	£80m and 3 years limits with RBS (Lloyds is also temporarily included until existing investments mature in 2018/19).
Building Society Deposits with a maturity of more than one year. These can be placed in accordance with the limits of the Council's counterparty list criteria (i.e. subject to satisfaction of Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors credit ratings criteria shown below).	None permitted at present.
Deposits with other local authorities with a maturity of	£15m limit with each local

	greater than 1 year and up to a maximum of 3 years. Maximum total investment of £15m with each local authority.	authority; maximum duration 3 years.
	Gilt edged securities with a maturity of greater than one year. These are Government bonds and so provide the highest security of interest and the repayment of principal on maturity. The use of UK Government gilts is restricted to fixed date, fixed rate stock with a maximum maturity of five years. The total investment in gilts is limited to £25m and will normally be held to maturity, but the value of the bond may rise or fall before maturity and losses may accrue if the bond is sold before maturity. The Director of Finance must personally approve gilt investments. The Council currently has no exposure to gilt investments.	£25m in total; maximum duration 5 years.
	Non-rated subsidiary of a credit-rated institution that satisfies the Council's counterparty list criteria. Investments with non-rated subsidiaries are permitted, but the credit-rated parent company and its subsidiaries will be set an overall group limit for the total of funds to be invested at any time.	Subject to group limit dependent on parent company's ratings.
	Corporate Bonds with a duration of greater than 1 year and up to a maximum of 5 years, subject to satisfaction of credit ratings criteria as set out below.	£25m in total; maximum duration 5 years.
	Collective (pooled) investment schemes with a duration of greater than 1 year. The total investment in collective (pooled) investment schemes is limited to £100m and can include property funds, diversified growth funds and other eligible funds.	£100m in total.
	Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper and Floating Rate Notes with a duration of greater than 1 year, subject to satisfaction of credit ratings criteria as set out below.	Subject to group banking limits dependent on bank / building society credit ratings.
	Housing Associations with a duration of between 1 and 2 years, subject to satisfaction of credit ratings criteria as set out below.	£25m in total; maximum duration 2 years.

CRITERIA FOR FUNDS MANAGED INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY

- **Banks General** - good credit quality – the Council may only use banks which:
 - a) are UK banks;
 - b) are non-UK and domiciled in a country with a minimum long-term sovereign rating of A- or equivalent;
 - c) have, as a minimum, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors credit ratings (where rated):
 - Short term – Fitch F3; Moody's P-3; S&P A-3
 - Long term – Fitch BBB+; Moody's Baa3; S&P BBB+
- **Banks 1A – UK and Overseas Banks (highest ratings)** - the Council may place investments up to a total of £30m for a maximum period of 1 year with UK banks (and up to a total of £15m for a maximum period of 1 year with Overseas banks) that have, as a minimum, at least at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors ratings (where rated).

	Short-Term	Long-Term
Fitch	F1+	AA-
Moody's	P-1	Aa3
S & P	A-1+	AA-

- **Banks 1B – UK and Overseas Banks (very high ratings)** - the Council may place investments up to a total of £20m for a maximum period of 1 year with UK banks (and up to a total of £10m for a

maximum period of 6 months with Overseas banks) that have, as a minimum, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors ratings (where rated).

	Short-Term	Long-Term
Fitch	F1	A
Moody's	P-1	A2
S & P	A-1	A

- **Banks 1C – UK and Overseas Banks (high ratings)** – the Council may place investments up to a total of £10m for a maximum period of 1 year with UK banks (and up to a total of £5m for a maximum period of 3 months with Overseas banks) that have, as a minimum, at least one of the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors ratings (where rated):

	Short-Term	Long-Term
Fitch	F3	BBB+
Moody's	P-3	Baa3
S & P	A-3	BBB+

- **Banks 2 - Part nationalised UK banks (Royal Bank of Scotland)** - the Council may place investments up to a total of £80m for up to 3 years with the part-nationalised UK Royal Bank of Scotland provided it remain part-nationalised (Lloyds is also temporarily included until existing investments mature in 2018/19).
- **Bank subsidiary and treasury operation** - The Council may use these where the parent bank has provided an appropriate guarantee and has the necessary ratings in Banks 1 above. The total investment limit and period will be determined by the parent company credit ratings.
- **Building societies** - The Council may use all societies that meet the ratings in Banks 1 above.
- **Money Market Funds** – The Council may invest in AAA rated Money Market Funds, including Variable Net Asset Value (VNAV) funds. The total invested in each of these Funds must not exceed £15m at any time (£10m for VNAV funds). This includes the Payden Sterling Reserve Fund for which a limit of £15m is also applied. No more than £25m in total may be invested in VNAV funds at any time.
- **UK Government (including gilts and the DMADF)** – The Council may invest in the government's DMO facility for a maximum of 1 year, but with no limit on total investment. The use of UK Government gilts is restricted to a total of £25m and to fixed date, fixed rate stock with a maximum maturity of 5 years. The Director of Finance must personally approve gilt investments.
- **Local Authorities, Parish Councils etc** – The Council may invest with any number of local authorities, subject to a maximum exposure of £15m for up to 3 years with each local authority.
- **Business Reserve Accounts** - Business reserve accounts may be used from time to time, but value and time limits will apply to counterparties as detailed above.
- **Corporate Bonds** – Investment in corporate bonds with a minimum credit rating of A- is permitted, subject to a maximum duration of 5 years and a maximum total exposure of £25m.
- **Collective (pooled) investment schemes** – these may comprise property funds, diversified growth funds and other eligible funds and are permitted up to a maximum (total) of £100m.
- **Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper and Floating Rate Notes** – These are permitted, subject to satisfaction of minimum credit ratings in Banks General above.

- **Housing Associations** – The Council may invest with Housing Associations with a minimum credit rating of AA-, for a maximum duration of 2 years, and with a maximum deposit of £10m with any one Housing Association and £25m in total.
- **Sovereign Ratings** – The Council may only use counterparties in countries with sovereign ratings (all 3 agencies) of A- or higher.

These currently include:

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

AA

- U.K
- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France

AA-

- Belgium
- Qatar

ANNEX 3. Prudential and Treasury Indicators

Prudential and Treasury Indicators are relevant for the purposes of setting an integrated treasury management strategy and require the approval of the Council. They are included separately in Appendix 1 together with relevant narrative and are summarised here for submission to the Council meeting for approval.

The Council is also required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The revised Code (published in 2009 and updated in 2011 and 2017) was initially adopted by full Council on 15th February 2010 and has subsequently been re-adopted each year in February.

PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	actual	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate
Total Capital Expenditure	£53.0m	48.1m	£61.6m	£37.9m	£26.7m
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Net borrowing requirement (net investments for Bromley)					
brought forward 1 April	£257.3m	£268.8m	£256.0m	£218.2m	£190.6m
carried forward 31 March	£268.8m	£256.0m	£218.2m	£190.6m	£191.7m
in year borrowing requirement (movement in net investments for Bromley)	+£9.5m	-£10.8m	-£37.8m	£27.6m	+£1.1m
Capital Financing Requirement as at 31 March	£3.1m	£2.3m	£1.6m	£1.1m	£0.6m
Annual change in Cap. Financing Requirement	-£0.7m	-£0.8m	-£0.7m	-£0.5m	-£0.5m

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	actual	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate
Authorised Limit for external debt -					
borrowing	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m
other long term liabilities	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m
TOTAL	£60.0m	£60.0m	£60.0m	£60.0m	£60.0m
Operational Boundary for external debt -					
borrowing	£10.0m	£10.0m	£10.0m	£10.0m	£10.0m
other long term liabilities	£20.0m	£20.0m	£20.0m	£20.0m	£20.0m
TOTAL	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m	£30.0m
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Upper limit for variable rate exposure	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for more than 365 days beyond year-end dates	£170.0m	£170.0m	£170.0m	£170.0m	£170.0m